

~~SECRET~~

Attachment  
USIB-D-21.1/4  
28 February 1963

25X1X7

25X1X7 Comments on [REDACTED] Comments on  
[REDACTED] Estimate of the Communist Chinese Air Threat  
Against India", 17 January 1963

25X1X7

25X1X7

1. [REDACTED] comments on the [REDACTED] Estimate of the Communist Chinese Air Threat to India" have been carefully studied and we have thoroughly rechecked our information on the points raised. In nearly all cases we find our data supports the positions taken in the original paper.

25X1X7

2. In some cases the apparent difference between the [REDACTED] 25X1X7 estimate and the [REDACTED] position results mainly from the use of different assumptions or methodologies rather than conflicting data. For example:  
(a) In estimating aircraft strength which could be brought to bear we assumed no stockpiling. If the stockpiling concept is accepted, we agree that 60 IL-28s and 108 MIG-15/17s could be accommodated, except we believe four months stockpiling would equate only to about 42 days combat supply rather than 90.  
(b) Our estimate of lower logistic capabilities is based on a tested and widely accepted methodology in which road capacities, terrain, and weather are considered. In the case of Tibet it is these factors rather than truck availability which sets the limits. (c) [REDACTED] I and II are designations of the two runways on the field we call "Lhasa". 25X1X7

25X1X7

3. We can give no credence to the [REDACTED] estimate of 45 TU-16 (BADGERS) of which 32 are estimated deployable against the Indians. We have re-examined our evidence, which we believe to be solid, and reaffirm with a high degree of confidence our original estimate of two such aircraft.

4. We continue to believe that our estimates of aircraft capabilities and high altitude limitations are valid. We do not believe that experience with transports provides valid data on which to judge military jet high elevation landing and take-off performance and we believe that low pressure tires are not adaptable to jet-fighter wheel wells. We have no evidence comparable to that [REDACTED] cite regarding Chinese radar capabilities in the Himalayas and stand by our previous estimate.

25X1X7

5. We are still checking all available data to see if we can find confirmation for the additional airfields listed by the [REDACTED]

25X1X7

25 February 1963